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Abstract 
This study is conducted in order to detect if the female directors on 
board would have influence on the oversight function of the whole 
board and finally influence the audit fee. The motivation of this study 
is the increasing number of the female members in the workplace as 
well as the increasing number of female directors on board. This study 
focus on the UK market, so the data used in this paper is derived from 
FTSE 250 and the major methodology adopted in the empirical study 
is OLS regression method. The final results show that in UK market, 
the female directors cannot have that much influence on audit fees 
(the proxy of audit efforts), which shows different results from that in 
US market. Besides that, there is also other findings in this study, for 
example, the main determinants of the audit fee should be the 
operational and financial statistics of the company, the board 
characteristics cannot influence the audit efforts either.  
 
Key words: female directors, audit fees, audit efforts. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
With the booming of worldwide economy, the competition between 
companies is increasing as well, especially between the public leading 
companies, because their performance could be totally reflected in 
their annual financial reports. But there is a circumstance that the 
financial report does not reflect the truth of the company, in the other 
words, the financial report does not well be monitored by either the 
auditors or the board of directors. The bankruptcy of many large 
companies such as WorldCom and Enron reminds us the importance 
of the audit and the effective companiesÕ directorsÕ oversight. There 
has been several researches studying on how the board 
characteristics could influence the corporate disclosures, earnings 
quality and pay-performance relationship (Ajinkya et al. 2005; Gul et 
al. 2003; NieMI 2005). Board characteristics such as outside 
directorsÕ expertise, board independence, and board leadership could 
have large influence on the level of separation of management and 
the control right of a company, which is very essential for efficiency 
and effectiveness of a companyÕs daily operation. What is more, the 
board characteristics could affect the how the board of director 
execute the daily oversight and monitor function. On the other hand, 
there is no doubt that the outside independent auditor plays an 
important role in monitoring the financial condition of a company 
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(Watts and Zimmerman 1986). The quality and the reliability of 
audited financial report could build the investorsÕ confidence. The 
audit quality could be reflected by the degree of discovering the 
material misstatement and disclosing it in the clientsÕ accounting 
system (DeAngelo, 1981). In the other words, the financial statement 
with higher audit quality could minimise the misstatements. There 
has been numerous researches pay their attention on the linkage 
between the various board characteristics and audit fees. Among 
which, a well-known one is carried out by Carcello et al. (2002), which 
illustrates that companies with more independent and diligent boards 
could demand much higher audit efforts (which is represented by 
audit fee) primarily for the sake of protecting the boardÕs interest.  
  
It might be strange that the stronger board would lead to the need of 
higher audit effort, for that the stronger board could effectively 
improve the quality of financial reporting, as a result, it should be 
reduce the need for external auditing. But to the contrary, the 
stronger board has the higher needs in reducing the risk faced by the 
shareholders and the directors themselves in order to protect their 
interests. Consequently, it could increase the needs for external audit. 
Ferdinand et al. (2008) illustrates that the demand for auditing is a 
function of the total risks faced by the both the shareholders as well as 
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the board members in the company. To be more specific, stronger 
boards need more audit efforts because they manage to keep good 
reputation capital and intend to get out of unnecessary legal liability. 
(Gilson, 1990). What is more, by demanding higher audit effort, 
companies could gain the trust of shareholders and give them 
confidence in investing. By using higher level of audit effort, the 
stronger board could provide the public more true and more reliable 
information which indirectly build the corporate social responsibility 
and bring company more benefits for the long-term consideration. 
 
It has been shown that the board independence, board diligence and 
expertise are positively related to the audit effort (represented by 
audit fees)(Carcello et al, 2002). In this paper, with controlling for the 
above board characteristics, the association between board gender 
diversity and audit effort is investigated. Based on the previous study 
(Gul 2008), the audit effort is measured in audit fee. There is more 
and more evidence that companies with diverse boards have better 
performance, for instance, they can achieve higher sales, higher 
returns on invested capital and higher returns on equity (Sealy R. 
2012). It is an indisputable fact that the female plays an increasingly 
vital role in the work and female directors are becoming an important 
element of UK company boards. The Table 1.1 below show the female 
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index of FTSE, it can be seen clearly that, by the end of March 2012, 
both the number and the proportion of female director keep 
increasing steady in the last preceding years from 2009 (Sealy R. 
2012). What is more, these numbers would keep growing. It is 
predicted that a total percentage of women on boards would be 
26.7% in 2015 and 36.9% by 2020 (Sealy R. 2012). 
   
Table 1.1. Female FTSE Index 2009-2012 
 
Female FTSE 100 2012(15mth
s) 
2010 2009 
Female held directorships 163 (15.0%) 135 (12.5%) 131 (12.2%) 
Female executive directorships 20 (6.6%) 18 (5.5%) 17 (5.2%) 
Female non-executive 
directorships 
143 (22.4%) 117 (15.6%) 114 (15.2%) 
Women holding FTSE 
directorships 
141 116 113 
Companies with female 
executive director 
17 16 15 
Companies with at least one 
female directors 
89 79 75 
Companies with multiple female 
directors 
50 39 37 
Companies with no female 
directors 
11 21 25 
!
Despite all of that, little is known whether the presence and the 
proportion of female directors has influence on the auditing process. 
This conjecture emerges from numerous literature in management 
and psychology areas which demonstrates that the female directors 
are risk and complexity averter, which could make different decisions 
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from male directors. In the other words, boards with female directors 
manage to demand higher level of oversight in order to protect the 
companyÕs reputation capital (Gilson 1990). Furthermore, gender 
diversity of the board has become a central theme of corporate 
governance reform efforts worldwide (Renee et al, 2009). Specifically 
speaking, female directors behave differently especially in attendance 
rate, which means that female directors have less attendance 
problems than the male directors. In addition, the presence of female 
directors could influence the attendance rate of male directors. Renee 
et al (2009) find that the greater the proportion of female directors on 
the board, the better is the attendance rate of the male directors. 
With higher attendance, the board of the company could execute the 
monitor function better. Other literature also suggests that when 
making decisions, the female is more sensitive to ethical issues than 
the male. Therefore, female directors might be more sensitive and 
demand higher level of audit effort in the financial reporting process.  
 
With the current trend that more female would engage in the board of 
a company and according to the broader literatures which argue the 
different ways that different genders behave in monitor function, we 
suppose that company with female directors in the board would be 
more sensitive to the ethical and legal issues as well as manage to 
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protect good reputation and shareholder interests, all of which could 
be reflected in the financial reporting process. As a result, more audit 
effort is acquired to fulfill the female directors monitor function, which 
would finally be reflected in more audit fees and better audit quality, 
certeris paribus. 
 
This paper aims at testing the impact of female directors on the audit 
efforts represented by audit fees by using the a sample of 
non-financial companies derived from FTSE 250 for the fiscal year 
2011 to 2012. The next section will introduce a series of related 
literatures about the role of the board and the impact of gender 
diversity on corporate board effectiveness. And then it is the chapter 
of research design which contains the detail of the data, hypothesis, 
the designed model and the introduction of the variables. Follow that, 
it is the chapter of empirical results and analysis. A further test would 
be conducted to test the impact of female directors on audit efforts 
more precisely . 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Background Introduction 
With the development of economy and society, not only the more and 
more female take work in general workplace, but also there is an 
increase in the percentage of the female directors on the board as well. 
According to the GMI RatingsÕ 2012 Women on Board survey which 
includes data on over 4300 companies in 45 countries all over the 
world, it illustrates that there are incremental improvement in many 
respects of female director representation. For example, it is the first 
time that the female directors accounts for more than 10% of the total 
board members. Comparing with the percentage of female director in 
2011, the number increased 0.7 percentage point in the year 2012. 
What is more, it is also the first time for these 4300 companies that 
the proportion of companies without female directors falls below 40% 
to 39.8%. However, comparing with the year 2011, the percentage of 
companies with at least 3 female directors increases by 1.3 
percentage point to nearly one in ten (9.8%) of companies all over the 
world. The following table 2.1 shows increasing of the worldwide 
aggregate proportion of female directors of the fourth quarter from 
year 2009 to year 2011. 
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Table 2.1 
Worldwide Aggregate Percentages Aggregate Worldwide Statistics 
2009 (Q4) 2010 (Q4) 2011 (Q4) 
Aggregate percentage of the 
female on Boards 
9.3% 9.8% 10.5% 
Percentage of Companies with at 
Least 1 Female Director 
56.1% 58.2% 60.2% 
Percentage of Companies with at 
Least 3 female Directors 
8.3% 8.5% 9.8% 
 
It can be seen from the table 2.1 above that every measure of female 
director representation is increasing steadily during that three years 
from 2009 to 2011. Specific speaking, the aggregate percentage of 
the female on Board increases from 9.3% of the fourth quarter of 
2009 to 10.5% of the fourth quarter of 2011. The percentage of 
companies with at least one female director is 56.1%, 58.2%, 60.2% 
respectively for the fourth quarter of these three years, which steadily 
increases 2.1 percentage point every year. The percentage of 
companies with at least 3 female directors is increasing as well from 
8.3% in 2009 with a little increase to 8.5% in 2010 and continuing 
increasing to 9.8% in 2011. As can be known from the table that not 
only more and more female begin to take an important role in the top 
of a company, but also more and more companies begin to accept the 
female as the top director.  
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The changes in the board gender diversity is also obvious in the UK 
companies. According to the Cranfield UniversityÕs The Female FTSE 
Report, 2012 has a step change in the number of female director. 
Specific speaking, for the FTSE 100 companies, the number of female 
directors increases from 141 in the year of 2010 to 163 in the 
beginning of 2012. Among the total 163 female directors, there are 20 
female executive directors and 143 non-executive directors. The total 
percentage of female directors is 15% at the beginning of 2012 which 
is 2.5% higher than the corresponding rate in 2010. The number of 
companies with more than one female directors increase to 50. 
 
For the FTSE 250 companies, 135 companies have female directors in 
their boardrooms which account for 54% of total companies and 
finally overweight the companies with all male directors. From the 
year 2010 to the year 2012, the number of companies with female 
directors increases from 119 to 135 and the number of companies 
with two female directors also increase from 25 to 40. The total 
female directors in FTSE 250 companies is 189, accounting for 9.4% 
of the total directorships, which has an increase of 1.6% comparing 
with the record in the 2010 Female FTSE Report. The following table 
2.2 shows the comparison of FTSE 100 and FTSE 250: 
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Table 2.2: FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Comparison 
At January 2012 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 
Female-held directorships 163 (15%) 189 (9.4%) 
Female executive directorships 20 (6.6%) 28 (4.6%) 
Female non-executive directorships 143 (22.4%) 168 (11.4%) 
Companies with female executive directors 17 (17%) 25 (10.0%) 
Companies with at least one female director 89 (89%) 135 (54%) 
Companies with multiple female directors 50 (50%) 47 (18.8%) 
 
From the table 2.2 above we can observe that the percentages of 
female on boards of the FTSE 100 companies are much higher than 
those of the FTSE 250 companies. Therefore, to some extent, FTSE 
250 Chairmen should realise the benefit of gender diversity on board 
and understand that it is not wisdom to ignore the influence of gender 
diversity in oversight function in respect of a corporate governance 
perspective (Agius 2012). In summary, the total number of female 
directors is increasing no matter in terms of the whole world or in 
terms of the UK FTSE companies, from which a posit can be put 
forward that the female director plays an increasingly important role 
on board of a companies. These changes may be because of the 
increasing social position of the female or for the reason that the 
companies begin to know the importance of the gender balance in the 
workplace. But no matter for which reason, the structure of the board 
is quietly changing. Therefore, comparing with the all male board 
before, there might be changes in the oversight function of the board 
with both male directors and female directors. It is timely therefore to 
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do some research on the nature and influence of the increasing 
quantity of female directors on the corporate governance in terms of 
financial reporting oversight in this paper.  
 
2.2 Role of the board 
The board of a company might be the top power mechanism that 
make efforts to control management opportunistic behaviour (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). A strong and effective board is very essential in 
dealing with business risks and providing strategic direction to the 
company (Wright and Cohen, 2002). While the type of the board could 
have large influence on the companyÕs strategic direction and finally 
influence the business risks confronted by the company. The board of 
directors act on the behalf of the companiesÕ shareholders in running 
the daily affairs of the company. The social network theory suggests 
that the elite group can be viewed as a social network and it predicts 
that the one who is more likely to have best chance to enter the elite 
network could have access to resources valuable to the company. 
Directors on the board can be viewed as the nodes in the network of 
an organisational linkages, and they will contribute valuable 
resources such as information, experience or knowledge to the board, 
the whole organisation and the other members in the network. The 
board shares their valuable resource and turn the whole organisation 
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as a socially cohesive group (Westphal and Zajac 1995; Windolf 1998). 
A board of a company is a closed group which has its own rules and 
thinking method. The agency theory which is a theoretical framework 
that is often used to explain the relationship between board 
characteristics and company performance, suggests that managers 
do not create value for their shareholders would be replaced (Fama  
1983). Therefore, along with monitor function, the main duty of 
directors of the board is intending to achieve as much interests for the 
shareholders as possible. Besides the shareholders interests, 
numerous researches illustrate that a company with stronger and 
more effective should provide with lower earnings management, 
lower audit risk but more disclosures (Bedard and Johnstone,2004; 
Gul and Leung,2004).  
 
In addition to the directors of the board, the external auditor also 
plays an essential role in monitoring the financial reporting of a 
company. The type of the boards, in other words the strength of the 
board, to a large extent, would have influence on the the strength of 
a companyÕs corporate governance and consequently influence the 
financial reporting quality and the business risk. With the monitor 
function as the board, auditing aims at ensuring the financial 
transparency that provides creditors, depositors and shareholders 
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with reliable assurances that the corporate manager would not make 
fraudulent activities. On the other hand, the external auditors and the 
demand for audit quality are influenced by corporate governance 
characteristics (for example the gender diversity, female leadership in 
this paper) and the legal system of company (Piot 2001). 
Subsequently, the composition of the board would impact the 
auditorÕs assessments and program planning decisions (Cohen and 
Hanno 2000).  
 
There are two explaining how the board of directors could influence 
the audit efforts. The two ways are classified into formal way and 
informal way (Carcello et al. 2002). Obviously, the formal way is how 
the board appoint their external auditor and the planned audit scope 
as well as the proposed audit fees (Gul, 2008). The informal ways 
means how the auditors are influenced by the boardÕs attitude 
towards the risk management and the overall monitoring. If the 
directors on boards express an attitude of demanding higher level of 
monitoring and lower risk, in other words, the board demands vigilant 
oversight, which gives the auditor an implication that the company 
needs more assurance from the auditor process. Many researches 
provide evidence that to a large extent, the auditors would assess 
risks and plan their audit testing depend on the boardÕs governance 
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(Cohen and Hanno, 2000; Cohen et al, 2002; Bedard and Johnstone, 
2002). By using the semi-structured interviews, it is found that the 
auditors have a broad range of opinions towards the factors included 
in how the company is governed by the board (Cohen et al. 2002). As 
Arthur Levitt, the former Chair of the U.S. Securities & Exchange 
Commission (SEC), suggests (1999) that, ÔThe linkage between a 
companyÕs directors and its financial reporting system has never been 
more crucial.Õ In the next part, based on the literature review, the 
linkage between the board gender diversity and the audit effort in 
financial reporting process will be examined.  
 
2.3 Gender diversity and corporate board effectiveness 
It seems that the increasing of the proportion of female director in the 
company board is imperative. In UK, there are more and more public 
debates related to the gender difference in corporate governance 
since the financial risk, especially in terms of risk preferences and 
leadership types. Comparing with the male, the female express 
different and unique characteristics such as unique perspectives, 
experiences and work styles (Daily and Dalton, 2003). When it comes 
to female directors, there are also different ways in providing 
leadership when making decisions and choices (Bilimoria, 2000). 
Rosener (1990) argues that the male are more likely to consider their 
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leadership as a kind of transactions with their subordinates, while to 
the contrary, the female prefer to transforming their subordinatesÕ 
self interest into a concern for the whole company. Gul (2008) 
express this argument in another way, which regards the female 
leadership style as a kind of Òinteractive leadershipÓ suggesting that it 
leads subordinates by motivating them and makes them have feels of 
participation and fulfillment. Consequently, rather than the 
competitive wok style used by the male, the female is more likely to 
achieve a cooperative work style. There is also evidence provided by 
Trinindad and Normore (2005) illustrating that the female intends to 
use more participative leadership with a transformational perspective. 
The female leaders are more able and to create a friendly working 
atmosphere in the board. Many researches provide evidence that the 
female directors on board offer many contributions (Bilimonia 1995; 
Segal 1996; Bilimoria and Huse 1997). The female leaders also can 
easily achieve an atmosphere of greater communications (Jelinek and 
Adler 1988), for example, they represented diversity, soft values and 
womenÕs issues. Besides that, female leaders ask much more 
questions than the male counterparts (Bilimoria and Huse,1997; 
Segal, 1996). Renee and Daniel (2009) illustrates that female 
directors are more likely to join in the monitoring committees, which 
indicates that the board with female directors would pay more 
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attention on monitoring.  
There are a great many of literatures in accounting area suggests that 
the female are more sensitive towards ethical problems than the male 
in most circumstances, especially when there is a need of making 
decisions related to ethic. (Cohen et al. 1998; Bernardi and Arnold 
1997). When it comes to ethical problems, the companiesÕ reputation 
should be firstly protected. So if there is female director on board, the 
more sensitive the female director is, the higher audit effort is needed 
for the sake of keeping the companyÕs reputation capital (Fama and 
Jensen 1983; Gilson 1990). It is also illustrated in the early studies 
that the female leader are more risk averse in decision making 
process, especially when they confront higher risk and complexity 
affairs (Brooks and Zank 2005), as a result, they always seek greater 
clarity when they making decisions. When the corporate governance 
is weak, if there is female director in the board, the board shows 
stronger oversight than the board without female director (Brooks 
and Zank 2005). Therefore, a board with female director could have a 
positive influence on the companyÕs monitoring function and tend to 
be more likely to allocate more effort on controlling risk. A study from 
the University of Leeds Business School has shown that having at 
least one female director on the board decrease the chance of going 
bankruptcy by nearly 20%, further more if there are two or three 
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female directors on the board, the chances of going bankruptcy would 
be decreased even more (Wilson 2009). In terms of attitude towards 
debt management, there are acknowledged gender differences. A 
recent study pays attention to the percentage of female directors in 
UK company failures and bankruptcies over the past ten years and 
particularly focus on the period when there were significantly more 
bankruptcies during the year of financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 
(Wilson et al 2009). It finds that there is a negative relationship 
between the number of female directors and the bankruptcy risk, in 
other words, the gender balance could reduce the bankruptcy risk. A 
great many of literatures also prove this view, for example, Ferrary 
(2009) argues that the female leaders tend to be more risk-averse 
and they prefer focusing more on a long-term perspective. There is 
also literature providing viewpoint from the respect of the male 
executives, which states that from the feeling and the experiences of 
the male executives, the female are more likely to be risk averse and 
are more willing to defend and issue of ethics or corporate governance 
(Wittenberg-Cox 2009). Lagarde (2010) who is the FranceÕs minister 
for the economy, industry and employment illustrates that "as a 
woman I am, perhaps, more keenly aware of the damage that the 
crisis has done". 
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There is also influence on the interaction between the male and the 
female directors if there is gender diversity in the board. Renee (2009) 
studies on the attendance rate of both female directors and male 
directors. In addition to the finding that the female directors 
attendance rate is relatively higher than the male directors, he also 
finds that if there is gender diversity in the board, the more women  
on the board, the higher the overall attendance rate is.  
 
The diversity of the board could increase its independence (Carter et 
al, 2003). It is criticised that if a board has similar board members 
with similar education, backgrounds, networks and genders. The 
independence of a board is critical for boards to function in the best 
interests of shareholders (Carter et al, 2003). In order to achieve the 
best interests, the board should keep enough independence. The 
female directors can enhance the board independence (Fondas and 
Sassalos 2000). Better decision-making is assumed to occur because 
of the directorsÕ various backgrounds and personal experiences. The 
gender diversity improve the board independence level because 
different genders could have different ways in problem solving. The 
female non-executive directors appear to be more seriously and 
preparing more conscientiously for the meetings (lzraeli 2000 and 
Solberg 2006). In terms of qualification that the female directors 
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owen, Singh et al (2008) find that the female directors are more likely 
to have MBA degrees and international experience. There is also 
status characteristics theory which states that how the standards of 
ability for low-status groups (for example, the female) are higher than 
the standards for high-status group members (for example, the male). 
Thus, in order to perceive the same position on board, the female 
have to prove their high ability and provide more evidence than their 
male counterpart (Biernat and Kobrynowicz, 1997). With considering 
the Status characteristics theory in parallel with the female traditional 
outsider status, the similar result is found by Hillman et al (2002) 
which illustrates that the female director is tend to have an advanced 
degree than their male counterparts. What is more, there is also 
evidence proving that female directors tend to be more wisdom and 
diligent than many male board members (Huse and Solberg, 2006). 
Green et al (2009) and Kunar (2010) suggest that the female financial 
analysts are generally more competent than male. The chance that 
decisions are made to be nodded is decreased for the reason that the 
female are often ask awkward questions. Therefore, in the other 
words, a gender mixed board might be a more activist board and the 
outside directors with viewpoints emerging from female ways could 
be considered the ultimate outsider (Carter et al, 2003). 
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Various kinds of evidence has shown that the female leaders behave 
different from their male counterparts. In summary, female directors 
of the board prefer a easily communication environment in their 
workplace (Wood et al 1985; Maznevski 1994; Fondas 1997; 
Schubert 2006) and they tend to be more sensitive to losses, more 
risk-averse, more diligent, more long-term-oriented and less 
competitive than the male directors. All this special characteristics 
could have influence on the daily board functioning. There is a 
conjecture that influence on the company could be more likely 
reflecting in the financial reporting process. Because the 
characteristics of female directors such as sensitiveness and 
risk-averseness could let the company demand higher level audit 
effort to avoid legal liability. The easily-communication atmosphere 
created by the female directors could easily give the companyÕs 
rigorous attitude to the external auditors. In addition, the 
characteristic of diligence makes the female director more likely to 
join monitoring committees (Adams and Ferreira 2009), which could 
execute better monitoring function along with the auditors. This paper 
is consistent with the early literatures on gender differences in 
monitoring function and examine how is the gender diversity could 
influence a companyÕs audit effort spending in the financial reporting 
process. 
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Chapter 3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample data  
The companies used to examine the board gender diversity effect on  
audit process are139 companies across nine industries from FTSE 250. 
FTSE 250 describes companies that ranked from 101 to 350 in respect 
of their market capitalisation. This paper excludes 111 financial 
institutions of FTSE 250, for the reason that the financial institutions 
have different financial structure and regulatory requirements (kuang 
2011). The main resource of the data used in this paper is FAME 
database. There is also some data that cannot be found in FAME, 
which is found in the annual report of each company for fiscal year 
2012. The data of fiscal year 2011 to 2012 is adopted to operate all 
the tests. So the sample selected is constructed by 139 non-financial 
companies of FTSE 250 and the data used is during the period from 
2011 to 2012. The table 3.1 below shows the details of the selected 
companies within FTSE 250: 
 
Table 3.1. The details of the selected companies: 
Industries Subclassification Number of 
companies 
Oil & Gas 
  
Oil & Gas Producers 8 
Oil Equipment Services & Distribution 1 
Basic Materials 
  
  
  
Chemicals 4 
Forestry & Paper 1 
Industrial Metals & Mining 1 
Mining 6 
Industrials 
  
Construction & Materials 3 
Aerospace & Defense 5 
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General Industrials 3 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 6 
Industrial Engineering 4 
Industrial Transportation 1 
Support Services 20 
Consumer Goods 
  
 
Beverages 2 
Food Producers 3 
Household Goods & Home Construction 6 
Personal Goods 3 
Health Care 
  
Health Care Equipment & Services 2 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 4 
Consumer Service 
  
  
Food & Drug Retailers 4 
General Retailers 10 
Media 6 
Travel & Leisure 16 
Telecommunication
s 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 4 
Mobile Telecommunications 1 
Utilities 
  
Electricity 1 
Gas Water & Multiutilities 1 
Technology 
  
Software & Computer Services 8 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 5 
 
3.2 Research Methodology 
The studies which aim at establishing casual relationships between 
variables could be termed as explanatory studies (Saunders et al 
2007). The explanatory studies emphasised that it has to do with 
studying a problem for the sake of explaining the linkages between 
variables. As for this paper, it mainly aims at finding out the 
relationship between the representation of female directors and the 
audit efforts, so this paper can be defined as an explanatory study. 
The methodology adopted in this paper is ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression, we pool the data of different industries and regress the 
proxy of audit effort on a set of variables. By using the OLS regression, 
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it becomes possible to test the statistically relationship between the 
independent variables and dependent variables. In this paper, by 
using the OLS regression, the relationship between the 
representations of female director and the audit efforts would be 
assigned a statistic correlation. Because with using the ordinary least 
squares regression, the variance around the estimators for the 
parameters can be the smallest possible. This method is most 
commonly used and gives the best linear unbiased estimators for the 
relationship between the independent variable and dependent 
variable. So the OLS regression could be the most appropriate 
method for this paper. In addition to the OLS regression method, this 
paper also use frequency count, mean, standard deviation of the 
variables. By using these method, the direct view of the female 
directors distribution could be observed. The current status of the 
female directors in FTST 250 non-financial industries could be 
observed through these methods as well. The software used to finish 
the regression is Stata.  
 
T-test is used to see if the relationship between the dependent 
variable and independent variable is significant. As known that this 
paper uses OLS regression to test the hypothesis, whether the 
regression coefficient is the appropriate would need to be tested by 
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using the t statistic test. The t-statistics are calculated by dividing the 
regression cofficiednts by their standard errors. The t-distribution is 
assumed to subject to the normal regression analysis. The level of 
confidence should be set up before the test. It is usual to test for the 
statistical significance at the 99% or 95% level of confidence. That 
means the coefficients have probability of 99% or 95% that are not 
due to chance. The confidence level used in this paper for the t-test is 
95%. 
 
3.3 Hypothesis 
Under the changes in the board gender diversity, the need for 
research on the impact of the female directors is increasing as well. 
This paper aims at examining how the audit effort could be influenced 
by the female directors in the board. The audit effort is measured by  
audit fees (Gul 2008). Within the high competition audit market 
(Healy and Palepu 2003), the market forces audit companies to 
reduce the audit rents in audit fees. As a result, the audit fee is better 
in representing audit effort than audit rents. There is also audit fee 
model which has validated that the audit effort can be proxied by 
audit fees, for that there are many variables tend to influence more of 
audit fees than audit rents. (Craswell and Francis 1999).  
 
Based on the early literatures, we have suggested that female 
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directors tend to increase the scope of board monitoring and auditing, 
and then increase the audit fee. Besides that, female directors are 
more likely to avoid risk especially when the problem is more 
complexity. As a consequence, a conjecture could be put forwards 
that the presence of the female directors would result in more 
independent and diligent boards which could lead to higher audit fees. 
Therefore, we set up a series of null hypothesis to test whether the 
presence of female directors and the number of the female directors 
on board could have influence on the audit fees. There are totally four 
null hypotheses that are set up as follow: 
 
H0a: There is no linkage between the presence of female directors on 
the board and audit fees. 
 
H0b: There is no linkage between the proportion of female directors on 
the board and audit fees. 
 
H0c: There is no linkage between the presence of female 
non-executive directors on the board and audit fees. 
 
H0d: There is no linkage between the proportion of female 
non-executive directors on the board and audit fees. 
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The confidence level we choose in this paper is 95%, which means 
that after doing the t-test, if the p value is bigger than 0.05, the 
coefficient between the dependent variable and the independent 
variable is not accepted, which means we accept the null hypothesis. 
To the contrary, if the p value is smaller than 0.05, we consider the 
happening of the null hypothesis is a small probability event, so we 
reject the null hypothesis. Specifically, taking the hypothesis H0a as an 
example, if the p value for the t-test of H0a is bigger than 0.05, then 
we cannot reject the hypothesis H0a which means that there is no 
linkage between the presence of female directors on the board and 
audit fees. 
 
3.4 Model designed for testing the hypothesis 
Based on the model introduced by Carcello et al. (2002) and the 
model of Gul et al. (2011), the model designed to test the board 
gender diversity effect on audit fees in this paper is as follow: 
 
  LNAF= d0 + d1 F + d2 NOME + d3 NEDPR + d4 NOOS + d5 GEA + d6 
LNTA + d7 INV + d8 ARTA + ε 
 
 
3.4.1 The definition of variables: 
LNAF : the natural log of the audit fee. 
 28!
!
F : the describe of situation of female directors on the board: 
     FD : the presence of female directors 
          FD=1 means there is at least one female director on the 
board 
          FD=0 means there is no female director on the board   
     FDPR : the proportion of female directors on the board 
     FND : the presence of non-executive female directors 
          FND=1 means there is at least one non-executive female 
director on the board 
          FND=0 means there is no non-executive female director on 
the board   
     FNDPR : the proportion of female non-executive directors on the 
board 
NOME : the total number of meetings held by the companyÕs board in 
the fiscal year 2011-2012 
NEDPR : the percentage of total non-executive directors on board. 
NOOS : the total number of operating segments of each company 
GEA: the gearing ratio stands for the leverage of the auditee company 
LNTA : the natural log of total assets 
INV : total inventory divided by the total assets 
ARTA : accounts receivables divided by the total assets 
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Audit fee 
In order to improve the linear fit of the data, in the first regression 
model, the natural logarithm is used as the dependent variable 
(Francis 1984; Craswell et al. 1995). Besides that, since the audit fee 
could be a large number which would have huge variation, logarithmic 
transformation is adopted to make audit fee more easy to be 
compared. But in some circumstance, there are problems in 
measuring this dependent variables. The first problem is related to 
the company structure, for that the audit fees paid by subsidiaries 
would be normally be disclosed, to the contrary, the audit fees paid by 
the associated companies might not be fully disclosed. Secondly, the 
current yearÕs audit fee is an estimation and adjusted based on the 
previous yearsÕ audit fees. As a result, the bias could be produced due 
to the inaccurate estimation on both current year and previous years, 
which could lead to the inaccurate disclosure (Philip et al. 1993). But 
as the interviews conducted by Philip et al. (1993), even though there 
is some problems in the disclosure of audit fees in practice, the bias 
are more likely to be small, especially for lager companies. In this 
paper, the data adopted is derived from companies in FTSE 250, 
therefore the audit fee is considered as a appropriate variable for the 
test. 
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Independence 
NEDPR represents for the outside directors, which is 
non-management directors on the board, measured by the the 
percentage of total non-executive directors on the board. The board 
of a company is considered to be more independent when the 
proportion of outside directors on board is greater (Beasley 1996). In 
most cases, the owners of large corporations are not the ones who 
manage the corporation. As a consequence, there is a probability that 
the managers would misreport the financial reports to achieve their 
own interests (Watts and Zimmerman 1983). While the outside 
directors who are the representatives of the owners of the company 
are responsible for monitoring the the managersÕ behaviour in order 
to prevent such misreported financial reports (Fama and Jensen 1983) 
and protect the interest of shareholders. There is particular incentive 
for outside directors to execute the monitoring function, which is 
driven by many factors. Firstly, in respect of the outside directors 
their own interest, the outside directors manage to insure the quality 
of financial report for the sake of protecting their own reputation as 
experts as a monitor of a company. What is more, the directors who 
fail to exercise reasonable care in dis-charging their monitoring 
responsibilities are subject to severe sanctions (Gilson 1990; 
Sahlman 1990). Besides that, the market also give directors 
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punishment when the monitored company is deep in financial crisis or 
have poor performance (Fama and Jensen 1983; GEson 1990). The 
misreported financial reports might result in huge losses of the 
shareholders (Beasley et al. 1999), therefore, the outside directors 
might manage to protect shareholdersÕ interest which would result in 
higher demand of audit efforts. A kind of extreme case of financial 
report misreported is fraudulent reporting. Many researches has 
found that the negative relation between the proportion of outside 
directors on the board and the frequency of occurrence of fraudulent 
financial reporting (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996). A method in 
controlling the misreported and fraudulent financial reporting is to 
obtain higher quality audit services. Therefore, the outside directors 
might be more concerned with the financial report quality because of 
their special responsibility. As known that the outside directors are 
more concerned with the financial report quality, the audit efforts are 
demanded higher with the increase of the number of outside directors. 
In other words, the more outside directors a board has, the more 
independent the board is and the more audit effort is needed, which 
would consequently lead to the increase of audit fees. So when testing 
the influence of the gender diversity effect, the independence of a 
board which could have much influence on the audit efforts, so it  
should be controlled. 
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Diligence 
NOME represents for the board diligence, which is measured as the 
total number of formal meetings that a board held in fiscal year 
2011-2012. Although there are many measures could represent the 
board diligence, for example, the preparation before meetings, 
attentiveness and participation during meetings or post-meeting 
follow-up (Carcello 2002), but the meeting numbers is the only 
observable factor. It is illustrated that the more meetings held by the 
board, the more diligent the board is and the more effective the board 
is in functioning oversight (Conger et al. 1998). With the increase of 
the number of meetings held, the enhanced level of oversight could 
demand higher quality of financial report. So there is a need of higher 
audit effort, which could result in higher charged audit fees. Therefore, 
when testing the impact of the presence and the proportion of female 
directors on audit fees, the factor of board diligence need to be 
controlled. 
 
Auditee complexity 
Besides the variables that are related to the conditions of a companyÕs 
board. There are important factors that could influence the audit fee a 
lot. For example, the auditee complexity is an important factor of 
audit fee model, since the complexity to some extent could reflect the 
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nature of the auditee, for example the location of the auditee, the 
operating segments of the auditees (Chan et al. 1993). It is 
undoubtful that the complexity of auditee increases the difficulty level 
of financial reporting process, so the more audit effort is needed to 
monitor the financial situation of the whole company. Therefore, the 
audit fee is expected to be higher when there is higher level of 
complexity. This viewpoint has been proved by many prior researches. 
In the previous researches, the level of complexity is measured in two 
ways: the financial measurement and the non-financial measurement. 
When it comes to the non-financial measurement, the number of 
subsidiaries, the number of foreign subsidiaries and the operating 
segments are frequently adopted to measure the level of complexity 
(Haskins and Williams 1988; Rose 1999; Carcello et al. 2000; Gul 
2008;). The number of operating segments (NOOS) is used to 
represents for the complexity of a company, which is measured as the 
operating segments of a company. In this paper, the definition of 
operating segment is according to IFRS 8 (International Financial 
Reporting 8), which requires that Òparticular classes of entities 
(essentially those with publicly traded securities) to disclose 
information about their operating segments, products and services, 
the geographical areas in which they operate, and their major 
customers (IFRS 8 2006).Ó It can be seen that the more operating 
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segments in a company, the higher complexity level it is, which would 
directly result in higher audit efforts.  
 
Sometimes the non-financial measures are not adequate in fully 
representing a companyÕs complexity level. So the some financial 
measures are introduced. In order to achieve better control of auditee 
complexity, based on the research conducted by Gul (2008), the ratio 
foreign sales to total sales is also can be adopted to describe the 
complexity of sales revenue.  
  
Auditee size 
The size of a company is very important because that the size of a 
company could influence many factors such as total revenue, number 
of employees and assets. It is also an essential element in examining 
the determinants of audit fees. For that the large size company would 
have more kinds of activities than the small size companies. As a 
result, the large size companies are more likely to reveal more 
information related to their operation than the small size companies. 
Therefore more time and more audit efforts are demanded by the 
large size companies than the small size ones. The large size 
companies also have more financial resources to hire big international 
audit company, consequently, the large size companies would have to 
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pay more for the audit service and achieve the better audit quality due 
to the high standard of the audit service of bigger audit firms 
(Palmrose 1986; Carson et al. 2004; Vermeer et al. 2009). So in this 
paper, when testing the impact of female directors on audit fees, the 
sizes of the auditee companies must be considered as a control 
variable since its big influence on the audit fee. 
 
While there are a great many literatures hold critical views towards 
the relationship between audit fees and auditee size as well as audit 
quality and auditee size. Some researches show that there is a 
positive relation between auditee size and audit fees. Chan et al 
argues that auditee size had a significant influence on the audit fees. 
As for audit fees, generally speaking, large size companies have more 
financial information and more employees or more subsidiaries, which 
would lead to more difficult auditing process. Thus, the audit fee 
would increase with the difficulty of audit process. In South Korea, the 
quoted audit fees could represent the auditee size (Taylor et al. 1999).  
A great many of measures are adopted by previous studies to 
represent for auditee size. This paper use the most frequently used 
one which is natural log of total assets. This proxy is approved by 
many researchers (Chan et al. 1993; Craswell and Francis 1999; 
Johnson et 1995).  
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In addition to total assets, the total revenue of a company is also 
considered as a proxy of the company size. Many researchers support 
this view and take total revenue to represent the size of the company. 
Because sometimes the total assets cannot appropriately measure 
the company size when the company is a retail organisation and its 
major revenue comes from retailing. There is evidence proving that in 
UK the total revenue is the significant determinant for the audit fee 
(Greoyory and Collier 1996). The same researches are conducted by 
Zhang and Myrteza (1994) in Australia and Che Ahmal (1996) in 
Malaysia. There are literature also suggest that the total revenue 
could be the proxy for the size of companies (Wallace et al. 1994; 
Meek et al. 1995; Inchausti 1997; Depoers 2000; Naser et al. 2002; 
Prencipe 2004; Rouf 2011)  
 
Leverage 
The common statement illustrates that the leverage has impact on 
the earnings management. Because Becker et al (1998) illustrates 
that the company which has higher leverage would have greater 
incentives to manipulate earnings. For that the company that has 
higher leverage means that there is higher presence of asymmetric 
information which could be agency problems (Agrawal and Chadha 
2005). As for the audit fee, the company with higher leverage would 
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prefer to hire superior experts (professional auditor) to reduce the 
exposure to agency cost. The measurements for the leverage used in 
this paper is gearing ratio and debt ratio which could stand for the 
liability status of the auditee company. 
 
Other variables: 
There are some financial measures which could also influence the 
audit fee. Two frequently used ratios that can influence audit fees are 
inventory scaled by total assets (lNV) and account receivables scaled 
by total assets (ARTA). Both of these two ratios will be used in this 
paper. Previous researches illustrates that the inventory and account 
receivables are hard to audit than any other kinds of current assets 
(Chan et al. 1993). For some industries like retailing and 
manufacturing industry, the inventories have huge influence on their 
financial report because the net income and the total assets are 
closely related to the inventory. The companiesÕ total wealth would be 
significantly influenced if there are some changes happen to 
inventories. As a result, the inventory auditing become an important 
part of the whole auditing process. Besides that, there is difficulty in 
identifying the actual value and the ownership of the inventories, 
especially when there are various categories of inventories. Further 
more inventory auditing could be a complicated process, for that 
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sometimes it needs to observe the physical inventory count. So if the 
ratio inventory to total assets is bigger, the more audit effort is 
needed to finish the audit process. Another key ratio is total account 
receivable to total assets. Receivables reflect the debt and liquidity 
condition of a company. There is a large likelihood of bad debts if the 
company has too much account receivables. Consequently, in order to 
satisfied the shareholders, there is a likelihood that the managers 
would adjust the account receivables to reduce the bad debts. 
Account receivables auditing could be a tough work, so the more 
receivables there are, the more audit fees would be charged. 
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Chapter 4. Empirical analysis and results 
 
4.1 Sample analysis 
The sample used in this paper is 139 non-financial companies from 
FTSE 250 for the fiscal year 2011-2012. The total 139 companies are 
made up by 9 industries. The table 4.1 below shows the company 
details of the 139 companies and the general distribution of female 
directors of the 9 industries: 
Table 4.1. 
Industry No. of 
compan
ies 
Compani
es with at 
least one 
female 
director 
The % of 
company 
with 
female 
directors 
No. of 
total 
female 
directors 
No. of 
female 
directors 
per 
company 
Oil & Gas 9 6 66.7% 7 0.77 
Basic Materials 12 7 58.3% 12 1.00 
Industrials 42 34 81.0% 44 1.05 
Consumer Goods 14 10 71.4% 14 1.00 
Health Care 6 3 50% 5 0.83 
Consumer Service 36 30 83.3% 42 1.16 
Telecommunications 5 2 40.0% 3 0.60 
Utilities 2 2 100% 3 1.50 
Technology 13 9 69.2% 11 0.85 
Total 139 103 74.1% 141 1.01 
 
From the table 4.1 above, it can be seen clearly that even though the 
number of female directors is steadily increasing, it does not mean 
that every company would have at least one female director. But the 
popularising rate of all the 139 companies is 74.1% which is 
significantly high. Among the 9 industries, the percentages of 
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companies with female directors of 3 industries are higher than the 
one of the total percentage. The industry with the highest percentage 
of company with female directors is utilities industry with a 
percentage of 100% and the industry with the lowest rate is health 
care industry with a percentage of 40%. In terms of the average 
number of female directors, the average number of these 139 
companies is 1.01, which means that in the company of the 139 
companies, there is more than one female director. The 
telecommunication industry has the least average female director of 
0.6 female director per company, which may due to the its industry 
character. The utilities industry has the highest average number for 
the female directors which is 1.5 and the customer service industry 
ranks the second with an average female directors per company of 
1.16. As can be observed from the above table that the female 
directors has taken part in the operation of the board in every industry. 
Even though the industries with men playing the absolute leading 
roles, like industrials, telecommunications, technology, there are also 
female directors on board. So there could be impact made by the 
increasing amount and the popularsing of female directors.  
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Full Sample 
 
No Female Director on the board 
(N=36) 
At least one Female Director on the board 
(N=103) 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Mean  Median Std Dev Mean  Median Std Dev 
LNAF 6.1555 6.1622 0.8973 5.9804 5.9839 0.9236 6.2162 6.2146 0.8845 
FD 0.7410 1.0000 0.4397 - - - 1 2.0000 0 
FDPR 0.1250 0.1250 0.0955 - - - 0.1688 0.1429 0.0700 
FND 0.6906 1.0000 0.4639 - - - 0.9320 1.000 0.2529 
FNDPR 0.1086 0.1111 0.0928 - - - 0.1465 0.1250 0.0777 
NOME 8.7391 8.5000 3.3534 8.7143 9.0000 2.2039 8.7475 8.0000 3.6721 
NEDPR 0.6326 0.6250 0.3936 0.6137 0.6125 0.1423 0.6392 0.6250 0.4500 
NOOS 3.1007 3.0000 1.8466 3.1389 3.0000 1.7913 3.0873 3.0000 1.8740 
FSTS 0.6247 0.7117 0.3394 0.6560 0.8137 0.3587 0.6137 0.5489 0.3345 
LEVE 0.5405 0.5393 0.2341 0.4759 0.4162 0.1778 0.5631 0.5489 0.2476 
GEA (%) 89.8321 56.6900 121.8591 65.6719 44.0650 86.6090 98.7988 62.0200 131.8458 
CR (%) 1.7002 1.3300 1.3453 1.9333 1.5550 1.3164 1.6187 1.2700 1.3520 
CDR 0.5214 0.4112 0.4415 0.5075 0.4472 0.4049 0.5263 0.3754 0.4553 
RR 0.1971 0.1306 0.7333 0.4182 0.1536 1.4455 0.1227 0.1281 0.0941 
LNTA 13.7377 13.7006     0.9719 13.5799 13.5806 1.0301 13.7928 13.7272 0.9498 
LNTS 13.5222 13.6270    1.2019 13.1297 13.3701 1.4370 13.6607 13.6751 1.0815 
INV 0.2020 0.0805 0.7761 0.3732 0.0619 1.5000 0.1423 0.0882 0.1832 
ARTA 0.1308 0.1148 0.1165 0.1463 0.1217 0.1284 0.1257 0.1092 0.1125 
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According to the descriptive statistics table 4.2, among the 139 
companies, 36 of them are companies with no female directors and 
103 of them are companies with at least one female director. Since 
the table above is a descriptive table, it can give out the intuitive 
information of the statistics. The mean of the nature log of audit fee 
for the full sample is 6.1555 which is bigger than the mean of the 
companies with no female director but smaller than the mean of 
companies with at least one female director. The median of the nature 
log of audit fee for the companies with at least female director is 
6.2146 which is bigger than the full sample group and the group with 
no female director. Both of the mean and median would suggest that 
the companies with female directors would spend more on audit fees 
than the companies without female directors on board. The mean of 
the number of meetings held by the companies with female director is 
8.7475 which is bigger than the mean of meetings held by the full 
sample group and the mean of meetings held by companies without 
female director. This would indicate that the board with female 
director might be more diligent than the companies without female 
director. The proportion of the non-executive director (NEDPR) of  
the group with female director is 0.6392 which is bigger than the 
other two groups, which suggests that the companies with female 
directors might have more non-executive directors than the other two 
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groups. As for the LNTA, the both of the mean and the median of log 
nature of total asset for the group of companies with female directors 
are bigger than those of the full sample group, and the mean and 
median of full sample group are bigger than those of companies 
without female directors. This might indicate that the bigger size 
companies are more likely to have female directors. 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
Based on the literature reviews, after adjusting the regression, the 
appropriate variables finally used are shown as the table below: 
Table 4.3 The variables used in the regression in this section: 
 Abbreviation Interpretation 
Dependent  LNAF the natural logarithm of the audit fees 
Variables 
Test 
independent 
Variables 
FD the presence of female directors 
FDPR the proportion of female directors on the 
board 
FND the presence of non-executive female 
directors 
FNDPR the proportion of female non-executive 
directors on the board 
NOME the total number of meetings hold in the 
fiscal year 2011-2012 
Control 
independent 
Variables 
NEDPR the percentage of total non-executive 
directors on the board. 
NOOS the total number of operating segments of 
each company 
GEA the gearing ratio for the proxy of Leverage 
LNTA the natural log of total assets for the proxy of 
auditee size. 
ARTA accounts receivable divided by the total 
assets 
INV total inventory divided by the total assets 
 
 44#
#
As for the measurements of complexity, leverage, size, after a great 
number of trials in this paper, the number of operating segments, the 
gearing ratio, nature log of auditee size are chosen for the proxy of 
complexity, leverage, size respectively. What is more, the number of 
meetings and the percentage of total non-executive directors on 
board are included based on the study of Gul (2008).  
 
4.2.1 Presence of female directors and audit fees 
Table 4.4 Correlations between variables (LNAF-FD): 
 
As the table 4.4 above shows that the correlations between any two 
variables are smaller than 0.8, which means that there is no 
colinearity between the variables.  
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Table 4.5 The results of the regression to the hypothesis H0a. 
 
 
 
According to the results of the above regression, after eliminating the 
influence of the missing values, the total number of observations is 
104. The adjusted R squared is 0.46, which means that the 46% of 
the variables variation that could be explained by this model. 
Although the adjusted R squared is not high, it still could be accepted. 
As the expectation of the relationship between the audit fees and the 
presence of female directors, they have positive relationship with a 
coefficient of around 0.1916, which means that the presence of the 
female directors would have positive influence on the total audit fee. 
But the p value of the t-test is 0.198 which is bigger than 0.05 under 
the required confidence level of 95%. In that case, we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis H0a and accept that there is no linkage between 
the audit fee and the presence of female directors on board. As for 
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other variables, the number of meetings hold during the whole year 
shows the positive relationship with the audit fee, but the p value for 
the number of meetings is 0.284 which is bigger than 0.05, in other 
words, it is not significant. The proportion of non-executive directors 
is also positive related to the audit fee with a coefficient of 0.977 but 
the p value is 0.069 which is a little bigger than 0.05. The number of 
operating segments is positive related to the total with a coefficient of 
around 0.07 and the p value is 0.035 which is smaller than 0.05, 
therefore the number of operating segments is significantly positive 
related to the total audit fee. By the other words, the more operating 
segments there are in a company, the more audit fee would be 
charged. The p value for the gearing ratio (which represents for the 
leverage) is bigger than 0.05, so it is not significantly related to the 
audit fee. The proxy for the auditee size (LNTA) has a significantly 
positive coefficient with the audit fee, which means that the bigger the 
auditee company, the more audit fee would be charged. INV and 
ARTA are all significantly related to the audit fee but negative and 
positive related to the audit fee respectively. 
 
4.2.2 Proportion of female directors and audit fees 
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Table 4.6 The correlations between variables (LNAF-FDPR): 
 
As it shows in the table above that the correlations between any two 
variables are smaller than 0.8, which means that there is no 
colinearity between these variables.  
 
Table 4.7 The results of the regression to the hypothesis H0b. 
 
As can be seen in the table 4.7 above, the adjusted R squared is 
0.4523 which indicates that 45.23% of the observations can be 
described in this model. As can be seen from the table that the 
percentage of female directors on board is positive related to the audit 
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fee, but the p value is bigger than 0.05, which indicates the 
insignificance between the FDPR and LNAF. Therefore, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis H0b. The variable number of meetings shows 
the positive insignificant relation with the audit fee. Consistent with 
the previous regression, the NEDPR and GEA show the insignificant 
relationship with the dependent variable. The variables NOOS, LNTA 
and ARTA shows positive significance with the audit fee. On the other 
hand, the INV turns to be insignificant related with the audit fee.  
 
 
4.2.3 Presence of female non-executive directors and audit 
fees 
 
Table 4.8 The correlations between variables (LNAF-FND): 
 
As it can be seen from table 4.8 above that the correlations between 
any two variables are smaller than 0.8, which means that there is no 
colinearity between the variables.  
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Table 4.9 The results of the regression to the hypothesis H0c. 
 
The adjusted R squared in the table 4.9 is 0.4582 which shows the 
fitness of the model si 45.82%. The p value for the presence of female 
non-executive director is 0.247 which is bigger than 005, therefore 
there is no relationship between the presence of the female directors 
and the audit fee. The hypothesis H0c cannot be rejected. In this case, 
it means that audit fee cannot be influenced by the presence of female 
non-executive directors. As for the board characteristics NOME and 
the NEDPR, they show insignificant relationship with the audit fees. 
The proxy for the leverage shows insignificant coefficient. The number 
of operating segments continues showing the significant positive 
relationship with the audit fees. The variables LNTA, ARTA and INV all 
show the significant relationship with the audit fee.  
 50#
#
 
4.2.4 Percentage of female non-executive directors and audit 
fees 
 
Table 4.10 The correlations between variables (LNAF-FNDPR): 
 
As it can be seen from table above that the correlations between any 
two variables are smaller than 0.8, which means that there is no 
colinearity between these variables.  
 
Table 4.11 The results of the regression to the hypothesis H0d. 
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The table 4.11 above illustrates that the adjusted R squared is 0.4526, 
which shows that it has acceptable explanatory power for this model. 
The p value for the FNDPR is 0.546 which shows that there is no 
relationship between the percentage of female non-executive director 
and the audit fee. The p value for the variables NOME, NEDPR, GEA 
and INV still bigger than 0.05, which indicates that they do not have 
significant relationship with the audit fee. To the contrary, the 
coefficients of variables NOOS, LNTA and ARTA keep significant with 
the audit fee.  
 
4.3 Results Analysis 
 
From the regression results, it can be detected easily that although all 
the coefficients are positive related to the dependent variables as 
expected, but they all shows the significant character, which shows 
different results from the studies made by Gul et al (2008). The 
results in this paper illustrates that there is no relationship between 
the presence of the female director and the audit fee, besides that the 
proportion of the female directors on board does not influence the 
final audit fee at all. There could be many reasons for the different 
results.  
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The first reason is the suspect to the widespread acceptance 
statement which states that the women are more risk averse than 
men. Although most of the researches have used different methods to 
prove this statement, there could be possibility that women are as risk 
averse as men or women are more loving risk than men. A study 
conducted by Nelson (2012) illustrates that the common belief that 
women are more risk averse than men is fundamentally a 
metaphysical assertion about the unobservable essences or 
characteristics, so it cannot be proven or disproven by the empirical. 
Consequently, the widespread acceptance of statement like this 
seems to be rooted more in confirmation bias than in the reality. In 
this case, the common suggestion that women are tend to be risk 
averse (Brooks and Zank 2005; Ferrary 2009) cannot be established. 
So the inference that the board with female directors would be more 
risk averse because of the there is female director who is more risk 
averse than the male director cannot be established. As a 
consequence, the statement that the audit fee would be charged 
higher because of the presence of risk averse female directors seem 
too arbitrary to prove the reality. 
 
The second reason to explain the insignificance of the coefficient is 
because the professional knowledge of the female directors. In terms 
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of the sample selected in this paper, the companies selected are 
public companies from FTSE 250, which means that the companies 
would have good performance because of their well ranked 
capitalisation. So for these companies, the director selection of the 
board would be strict. As for the female directors, because of the 
status characteristics theory (Biernat and Kobrynowicz, 1997), 
female directors within the low status group would be required more 
strict when they take a role on board. There is also evidence suggests 
that the female directors are more likely to have MBA degrees and 
international experience than their male counterparts (Singh et al 
2008). In summary, the female directors would be required more 
than the male counterparts in respect of the professional knowledge 
and qualifications. Therefore, the female directors on board would be 
more professional in their oversight function. A professional director 
would make decisions rely on the professional knowledge or the 
financial statistics he or she has instead of mostly relying on the 
personal emotion. Therefore, when the female directors make 
decisions towards the financial reporting, what they rely on should be 
the financial statistics they get through the financial statement. If 
there is a need for more audit effort would be relied on the financial 
statistics or the condition of the companies as mentioned in the 
designed model in this paper, like the size of the auditee,the 
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complexity of the company and so on, rather than the presence or 
percentage of the female directors on board. Because of the 
professional knowledge the female directors have, they should have 
clear recognition towards the business risk and the financial risk. 
Having known that the business risk has positive relationship with the 
interest and as the directors of the company, the duty is to keep the 
shareholdersÕ interest, therefore as being a director with professional 
knowledge, the female directors are not bound to avoid the needless 
risk. As a result, no matter female or male directors on board, they 
should have professional knowledge and judgement towards the 
financial circumstance of a company, so when making decisions on 
the audit processing, there could be no significant difference between 
different gender. By the other words, the gender diversity has few 
influence on the auditing process. 
 
The next reason in explaining the insignificant impact of female 
directors on the total audit fees should be the female directors are in 
minority status. As has been illustrated in the table , the mean of the 
proportion of total female directors for the total 139 companies is 
12.5% and the mean of proportion of female non-executive director is 
10.86%. Even though there is a increasing trend of new appointments 
of female directors every year, the proportion of female directors is 
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still much smaller than the percentage of the male directors, which 
means that on the board, the number female directors still accounts 
for a small part of the total number of the directors. With only 
approximately ten percentage of female directors, when having 
discussion or making decisions, the impact of the female directors 
could be small. What is more, since the status characteristics theory 
(Biernat and Kobrynowicz, 1997), the female directors has been the 
the low status group. The minority female group is in essence the low 
status group, so in order to perceive the same right and same position 
on board, which means that the female directors need to prove much 
more than the large amount of male directors to make influence 
during the decision making process, which makes female directors 
even harder in influencing the decisions. Even if there is influence 
made by the gender diversity or we can say the female directors on 
board, the influence could be small and even hard to be perceived and 
studied. So as for the influence on the auditing process, there might 
be influence on the auditing process made by the female directors, 
but the influence is too small to achieve. Therefore, the relationships 
between the proxies of female directors and the nature log of audit 
fees turn out to be insignificant. 
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The fourth reason for the insignificant relationship between the audit 
fee and the proxies of female directors on board could be the 
personality of the female directors. As known from the low status 
theory, the female directors need to make more efforts than the male 
directors on board (Biernat and Kobrynowicz, 1997). So the 
personality of the female directors might be tough, decisive, and 
brave, which is just like the male directors. The female directors might 
have masculine mind, which means that within the high competition 
and heavy workload, the female directors behave and think just like 
their male counterparts. So there is no obvious difference between 
female directors and male directors when they making decisions 
together. So there is no obvious increase in the auditing fee when 
there is female director on board. As for the unique style of leadership 
suggested by Trinindad and Normore (2005), the female directors are 
more like to take cooperative and participative leadership with a 
transformational perspective. These kinds of leadership and 
personalities seems to varies in each individual. By the other words, 
no all the female leaders tend to behave like the literatures suggest. 
There is possibility that the female directors take different leadership 
styles from the literatures and there is also possibility that the female 
directors adopt the same leadership styles, as a result, the influence 
of different leadership styles on the audit fee could be positive or 
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negative. In this paper, the female director from different companies 
might have different leadership styles and what is more, the influence 
of the different leadership styles would interact with each other and 
finally canceled each other out. In summary, the female directors on 
board might have influence on the audit fee, while the regression 
results show the insignificant relationships between the audit fees and 
the proxies of female directors for the reason that canceled out 
interaction between different influence of different leaderships. 
 
The fifth explaination for the insignificant relationship between the 
audit fees and the proxies of female directors could be the division of 
work for the female director on board. The allocation of work to the 
specific director would be different. As for monitoring the financial 
part of the company, the director takes charge for it might not be the 
female. So even though there are female directors on board, their 
responsibility might not focus on the financial part of the company. As 
a result, how they execute their work or what kind of leadership styles 
they have would not have huge impact on the auding process. To say 
the least, even though the female director could tend to perform more 
sensitive, more risk averse or tend to have the the kind of leadership 
which could positive influence on the audit fee, because they do not 
focus on the financial part of the company and their oversight function 
 58#
#
cannot execute in the financial part, the impact made by these female 
directors is too small to make the significant relationship between the 
presence of female directors and the audit fees. 
The next reason which could explain the insignificant coefficient for 
the representation of female directors is that the charging standard 
made by the audit firms. As the literatures suggest that the 
determinants of the audit fee are the size of the auditee company and 
the auditor firm, the complexity of auditee company, the loss standing 
for the operation status of the company or the elements of the auditee 
companyÕs capital structure (Carcello et al 2002), which are financial 
statistics that can describe the circumstance of the auditee company. 
In terms of the of the board characteristics, it seems that the 
influence is less. The same results could be detected from the number 
of meetings held by the board which is a variable standing for the 
board diligence. From the results of four regression models, we can 
see that although the coefficients for the NOME is positive, there is no 
significant relationship between the audit fees charged and the board 
diligence, by the other words, how many meetings a board held 
during one year does not influence the auditing fee charged. Standing 
in the audit firmÕs point of view, they would have their own charging 
standards which would not be made rely on the auditee companiesÕ 
board characteristics. When taking the project of the auditee 
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company, they would charge the auditee companies according to the 
financial status and operational status of the auditee companies. Even 
though the company demand high standard of monitoring through the 
audit processing, the charging standard is set before the auditing for 
the companies. Especially for the FTSE 250 companies, most of whose 
audit firms are Big 4, so the charging standards would be more clearly 
normative, and the most importance of which, the charging standards 
of Big 4 would be more evidence based. By the other words, the audit 
fee has less chance to be influenced through the informal way 
(Carcello et al. 2002). Specificly speaking, even if the auditor is 
influenced by the boardÕs attitude towards the risk management and 
the overall monitoring and directors on board express an attitude of 
demanding higher level of monitoring which gives the auditor an 
implication that the company needs more assurance from the auditor 
process., since the charging standard has been set, the audit fee 
charged by the audit firm is set. As a result, whether there is female 
director on the board of a company, the audit fee is charged mainly 
according to the charging standards made by the audit firms based on 
the financial and operational circumstance. Thus, it is reasonable that 
there is no significant relationship between the audit fees charged and 
the presence of female directors on the board as well as the 
percentage of the female directors.   
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The last reason which could explain the insignificance of the 
coefficients between the representations of the female directors on 
board and the audit fees charged is that the culture difference. There 
is evidence shows significant results of the impact of female directors 
on board and the audit fee. More precisely speaking, in the research 
made by Gul et al (2008), the results of the study show that there is 
significant positive relationship between the audit fee charged and the 
presence and percentage of the female directors, in the other words, 
if there is female director or female non-executive director on board, 
the audit fee would turn out to be higher. What is more, in Gul et al Õs 
(2008) study, the research results also illustrate that the audit fee 
charged would increase with the increase of the proportion of female 
directors and the increase of proportion of female non-executie 
directors. The research conducted by Gul et al (2008) is based on the 
sample selected from US firms, which is different from this paper. This 
data used in this paper is derived from FTSE 250, so this paper 
conducted based on the UK firms. There is huge culture difference 
between US and UK. The culture of UK tends to be more conservative 
than that of USA. The men are still playing the absolute leading role in 
a business. Comparing with the culture of UK, the US culture seems to 
be much opener and more free than the UK culture. As well, the UK 
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culture keeps more formal and more hierarchical than the US culture. 
Under the more free culture of US, the barriers for female directors in 
entering the board is less than that in UK and furthermore, the female 
directors would more easily participating in the decision making 
process, which means that it is easier for female directors under the 
US culture to make impact on the auditing process. Therefore, the 
female directors on board of US could have significant impact on the 
audit fee charged, to the contrary, under the different culture of UK, 
the impact of female directors on audit fee is not significant.    
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Chapter 5. Further Test 
In this section, four additional control variables of audit fees models 
are added  in the regression to have a further test of effect of gender 
diversity on audit fees. The new variables added in this section are 
auditee companyÕs risk status, the profitability level of the auditee 
company, the lagged accruals of the auditee companies, the price to 
book ratio of the auditee company, the free ratio of the auditee 
company. 
 
5.1 Introduction of additional variables 
Auditee profitability 
The auditee companyÕs profitability is considered to be an important 
factor which illustrates that the circumstance of the companyÕs 
management performance and how efficient it is in allocating the 
limited resources. The higher the profitability the company has, the 
less risk and more return it would have. But on the other side, the 
lower level of profitability could lead to the reduction of operation 
strength and the loss in the internal control. The profitability of 
auditee company could be calculated by using the loss or income 
figures that derived from the income statement (Firth, 1985; 
Ramanan & Simon, 1995; and Waresul & Moizer, 1996). There are 
many ratios that could explain the profitability of a company, such as 
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the return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on capital 
employed (ROCE) and return on investment (ROI). Many previous 
researches indicate that the profitability ratios are significantly 
influence the audit fees charged (Sandra and Patrick, 1996). Defond 
and Park (1997) states that the profitability of the auditee company is 
an important and significant determinant for the audit fees in Hong 
Kong. Joshi and Bastaki (2000) demonstrate that companies with 
higher level of profit would be subject to the more precise audit 
testing in the expenses and revenues, which would result in higher 
level of audit fees. A weak positive relationship has been found by Che 
Ahmad and Derashid (1996) in Malaysia by examining the ROE and 
the audit fee charged. There is also the opposite views towards the 
influence the impact of the profitability on the audit fees, for example, 
there is evidence that the companies with lower level of profitability 
would need to be audited more to avoid the risk. More audit effort 
would need to allocate to the companies with lower leve of profitability 
and thus, more auditing fee would be charged. As well, the companies 
with lower leve of audit fees need to be audited with a wider scope of 
work for the reason that the auditee companies would have going 
concern status and the cash flow issues (Chan et al, 1993). It is also 
argues that by using the measure of ROE to represent for the 
profitability and the negative correlation the ROE and auditing fee 
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would be obtained. On the basis of the previous literatures, two 
proxies for the profitability are tested in this paper: ROE and ROA. 
 
Audit risk  
Audit risk is can be defined as the risk that the auditor express an 
inappropriate audit opinion on the financial statement when the 
financial statements are materially misstated (IASSB 2007). The 
audit risk can be made from two parts, which are the risks caused by 
the financial statement and the audit risks caused by the auditor. 
There would be internal control risk and inherent risk when the 
financial statements are materially misstated. On the other hand, if 
the auditor do not detect the material misstatement in the financial 
statement, the sampling risk and detection risk would be arise. 
Therefore, the auditors take more responsibility for the audit risk than 
the auditee. The failure of auditing would result in the misleading the 
auditeeÕs shareholders and reduction of the the reputation capital for 
both audit and auditee company. For the sake of the controlling the 
audit risk, the auditor should not only have professional auditing skills 
but also have a well understand of the auditee. So evaluation on the 
audit risk of a specific auditee is essential. The auditor would increase 
the auditing fees for the auditee with higher level of audit risk. For the 
reason that if there is audit risk in the auditee company, the auditors 
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have to audit for a longer time and pay more efforts to finish the 
auditing process. So the audit fee is increasing with the audit risk. 
What is more, the auditee with higher audit risk would be asked for an 
insurance premium in order to control the loss on the failure of audit 
risk (Chan et al 1993).  
 
It is important to have an appropriate measurement of audit risk both 
for the well conducting audit and the academic research. It suggests 
that the measurements of audit risk should be on the basis of the 
auditeeÕs potential relevance and in practice on data (Pong and 
Whittington 1994). Financial ratios could be the main measurements 
in terms of practice aspect. Four ratios would be used in this paper. 
The first one is debt ratio which is found significantly influence the 
audit fee in UK market (Gregory and Collier 1996). It describes the 
the amount of liability of the auditee and if the auditeeÕ s asset is 
enough for payback its liability when it goes bankruptcy. The second 
one is current ratio which reflects the auditeeÕs payback ability in 
short time. It is  found that the current ratio have much impact on 
the audit fee in Hong Kong market (Francis et al 1997). It is obvious 
that if the a companyÕs debt ratio is high but the current ratio is low, 
the audit risk of the company would be higher because of the high 
probability of bankruptcy.  
 66#
#
The third ratio is receivable ratio which is used to evaluate the credit 
control and the ability of receiving cash in the short time (Elliott 2008). 
The higher receivable ratio indicates that the company fails to control 
the credits and bad debts risk. The last ratio used to evaluate the 
audit risk is cash current debt ratio, which could reflect the companyÕs 
ability in clearing debt. If the cash current debt ratio is high, it means 
that the company has adequate cash to pay for its liability. On the 
contrary, if the cash current debt ratio is low, it means that the 
company does not have the ability to pay the debt on time, on the 
other words, the audit risk is higher when the cash current ratio is 
lower. Audit fee would increase when the auditor detect higher audit 
risk. 
 
As the risk would have influence on the total audit fee, so in this part 
the audit risk is added to control the change of the audit fee. Four 
measurements are used separately in controlling the audit risk. The 
four measurements is current ratio, debt ratio, receivable and cash 
current debt ratio. The following shows the calculation formula for 
these four ratios: 
Current ration= Current asset/ Current liability                   
Debt ratio= Toatal liability/ Total asset 
Cash- debt ratio= Total net cash flow/ Total current liability 
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Receivable ratio= Total receivable/ Total sales 
                   
Lagged Accural (LA) 
Another variable lagged accruals is added as a control variable into 
the regression for the test of impact of female directors on the audit 
efforts. The lagged total accruals is added for the reason that the 
components of the last yearÕs total accruals could have elements that 
could have influence or magnitude this yearÕs total accruals. The same 
method is used by Guay et al. (1996) who suggests that the standard 
accruals expectations models should be enhanced through 
recognising that some of the accruals reverse over time. It suggests 
that if the company has too much accruals, the company would recuit 
professional auditor to audit the increasing accruals in order to control 
the discretionary accruals of the company.  
 
Price to book ratio (PB) 
The price to book ratio is calculated by dividing the current closing 
price of the stock by the lastest quarterÕs book value per share (online) 
and it is used to do comparison of the companyÕs stockÕs market value 
to its book value. If the P/B ratio of a company is lower, it indicates 
that the stock of the company is undervalued. While the undervalued 
stock price might indicate that something is fundamentally wrong 
with the auditee company. This is a ratio which could vary across 
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different industries. Another implication given by the price to book  
ratio is that it tells you whether you need to pay too much for what 
would be left if the auditee company went bankrupt immediately. So 
whether the PB ratio is too higher or too low would indicate an 
unappropriate circumstance for the company. With the extreme value 
of the PB ratio, the market expectation for the companies would be 
extreme, therefore there could be higher risk in sudden bankruptcy of 
the auditee company. As a result, the PB ratio is included in the 
regression model. 
 
Consequently, the model for the further test is designed as follow: 
  LNAF= d0 + d1 F + d2 NOME + d3 NEDPR + d4 NOOS + d5 GEA + d6 
LNTA + d7 INV + d8 ARTA + d9 ROA(ROE) +d10 CR+ d11 LA + d12 PB +ε 
 
 
5.2 Further test results 
After adjusting the regression, the variable selected used to evaluate 
the auditee risk is the credit ratio (CR) and measurement used to 
represent for the auditee complexity is still the number of operating 
segments of the auditee company. The variable adopted as the proxy 
for the auditee companyÕs profitability is return on total assets (ROA). 
By using the the selected variables, the regression results turn out to 
be more appropriate. 
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Table 5.1 The correlations between variables (LNAF-FD): 
 
 
It can be seen from table 5.1 above that the correlations between any 
two variables are  smaller than 0.8, which means that there is no 
colinearity between the variables.  
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Table 5.2 The results for testing the relationship between the FD and 
LNAF: 
 
 
As for the results of the regression shown above, after eliminating the 
impact of the missing values, the total number of observations turns 
out to be 100. The adjusted R squared is 0.4676, which means that 
the 46.76% of the variables variation that could be explained by this 
model. Therefore, the model is acceptable in explaining the 
observations. Although additional variables are added into the 
regression, the p value for the coefficient of the presence of female 
directors is still bigger than 0.05, which indicates that the there is still 
no influence made by the presence of the female directors on the 
audit fees. As for the new variables added in the regression model, the 
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p values for the new added variables are all bigger than 0.05, which 
show the insignificant relationship between the audit fee charged. 
 
Table 5.3 The correlations between variables (LNAF-FDPR): 
 
 
From table 5.3 above, what can be observed that the correlations 
between any two variables are smaller than 0.8, which means that 
there is no colinearity between the variables.  
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Table 5.4 The results for testing the relationship between the FDPR 
and LNAF: 
 
As the table 5.4 shows above, the adjusted R squared of the 
regression for testing the relationship between the proportion of 
female directors and the audit fee is 0.4611, which indicates that the 
regression model are well designed in describing the observations. 
Although the coefficient of FDPR is approximate 0.40 which shows 
that the audit fee would increase with the increase of the percentage 
of female directors. But under the confidence level of 95%, the p 
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value of FDPR is much bigger than 0.05, which means that the 
percentage of female directors on board does not have linkage with 
the audit fee.  
 
Table 5.5 The correlations between variables (LNAF-FND): 
 
As it tells in the table 5.5 above that the correlations between any two 
variables are  smaller than 0.8, which means that there is no 
colinearity between these variables.  
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Table 5.6 The results for testing the relationship between the FND and 
LNAF: 
 
It can be observed from the above regression results that, the 
adjusted R squared in 0.4619, in which case, the designed model 
could well explain the observations. Similarly with the previous 
regression results, the p value for the t test of FND is bigger than 0.05, 
therefore, it demonstrates that the presence of female non-executive 
directors do not influence the audit fee charged. The number of 
operation segments continues showing the positive relationship with 
the audit fees. Therefore, it can be said that the with the increase of 
the operating segments, complexity of auditee company is increase 
and the audit fee is also increase with it. 
 
 75#
#
Table 5.7 The correlations between variables (LNAF-FNDPR): 
 
 
As the table 5.7 above shows that the correlations between any two 
variables are smaller than 0.8, which means that there is no 
colinearity between the variables.  
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Table 5.8 The results for testing the relationship between the FNDPR 
and LNAF: 
 
As the table 5.8 above shows that the adjusted R squared is 0.4593, 
which means that the designed model has good fitness for the 
observations. Consistent with the previous results in this paper, the p 
value of FNDPR is bigger than 0.05, in this case, it demonstrates 
insignificant relationship between the percentage of female 
non-executive directors on board and the audit fee.On the other 
words, the proportion of the female non-executive directors on board 
does not have impact on the audit fees.  
 
As for the further test in this section, even though four additional 
variables are added in the regression model, the relationship between 
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the representations for female directors and the audit fee is still 
insignificant. The same as the representations of the female directors, 
the coefficients for the NOME, NEDPR are all shows insignificant 
relationship with the audit fee. In which case, it can be said that the 
board characteristics in UK companies do not have influence on the 
audit fee. Different from the board characteristics, variables like the 
number of operational segments, the size of the auditee company, the 
account receivables divided by the total assets are all significantly 
positively related to the audit fee. Therefore, it can be detected that 
the determinants of the audit fees are mainly the operational status 
and the capital structure of the auditee company. In terms of the new 
added variables, they all show there is no impact for the four new 
variables with the audit fee which showing the different results with 
the previous literatures, that might be due to the effect of the 
interaction of different variables and the effect of the board 
characteristics variables. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
This study is conducted for the sake of exploring if the female 
directors on board would have impact on the oversight function of the 
board and finally influence the audit fee. This study is motivated by 
the increasing number of the female members in the workplace and 
the increasing number of female directors on board. Since there is a 
great number of literatures suggesting that there are many 
differences between different genders in terms of work styles, 
personalities, communication methods. What is more, if the 
interaction between different genders could have influence on the 
work output is a question. However if these differences between 
different genders and the interaction with different genders could 
have positive impact on the companyÕs operation seems attractive, 
especially if the top female leaders could enhance the oversight 
function in terms of financial statement due to the unique 
characteristics that the female directors have. As a result, this paper 
pays attention to the relationship between the female directors on 
board and the audit effort which is proxied by the audit fees in order 
to see if the female directors on board could enhance the financial 
reporting through enhance the audit efforts. Based on the previous 
literatures, especially the one conducted by Gul et al (2008), it is 
suggests that the female directors on board should increase the audit 
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efforts, what is more, the audit efforts would be increased more when 
the proportion of female directors is larger. By the other words, the 
more female directors on board, the more money would be spent on 
the audit processing. For the sake of detecting the impact of female 
directors and on the audit fees, the study is conducted based on the 
UK market area and the sample selected are non-financial companies 
derived from FTSE 250. OLS regression method is used and four 
hypothesis are set before the regression. The four hypothesis mainly 
focus on the relationship between presence of female directors, the 
proportion of female directors, the presence of female non-executive 
directors, the proportion of female non-executive directors and the 
audit fees respectively. The further tests is designed to detect the 
influence of female directors in more detail. 
 
6.1 Empirical findings 
Though the regression method, there are many empirical findings are 
detected from the regression results. The results in this study show 
the different characters from the previous literatures. Specifically 
speaking that, although the coefficients for the presence of female 
directors, the proportion of female directors, the presence of female 
non-executive directors, the proportion of female non-executive 
directors all turn out to be positive, but the p values of these four 
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coefficients are more than 0.05, which indicates the insignificant 
relationships with the audit fee. Even though in the further test, when 
the additional control variables which could influence audit fees are 
added in the regression, the four coefficients for the proxies of female 
directors continue showing the insignificant results respectively. 
Therefore, it can be concluded as the female directors on board do not 
have influence on the audit efforts. Then six reasons are put forward 
in analysing the insignificant results. When doing the regression, 
there are also variables keep showing the significant relationship with 
the audit fees. These variable are number of operational segments 
(NOOS), the nature log of total assets (LNTA) and the account 
receivables divde by total assets (ARTA). In this case, what can be 
found is that these three factors have in essence influence on the 
audit fees. Even when in the further tests, all the three variables keep 
showing the significant positive relationship with the audit fee. To be 
more specifically speaking, the audit fee of a company is mainly 
determined by the complexity of the auditee company proxied by the 
operational segments, the size of the auditee company proxied by the 
total assets and the capital structure of the auditee company proxied 
by the account receivables divded by total assets. There is also 
empirical findings towards the variables which represent for the other 
board characteristics. The coefficients for the number of meetings 
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(NOME) and the proportion of non-executive directors on board 
(NEDPR) keep showing the insignificant relationship with the audit fee. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the board characteristics cannot 
influence the audit fee. In summary, the presence and proportion of 
female directors or female non-executive directors do not have 
impact on the audit efforts. As for the determinants of the audit fee, 
the characteristics of the board cannot influence the audit fee. The 
main determinants of the audit fee are the financial status and the 
operational status, such as the operational segments (NOOS), the 
nature log of total assets (LNTA) and the account receivables divide 
by total assets (ARTA). 
 
6.2 Implications 
The implications derived from this paper can be summarised in two 
aspects,  Which would suggest in terms of policy implications and in 
terms of the recommendation for future research. For the policy 
implications, with a large amount of literatures suggest that the board 
would work in a more efficient and effective environment when there 
are female directors on board, the policy makers should make policies 
to encourage the companies to absorb more female directors. Besides 
that, it is also important to rise the awareness of the public to pay 
attention to the capability of the female directors and let more female 
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directors take part in the board work. What is more, due to the low 
status of the female group, the most important of all is to lower the 
barriers for the female directors in entering the board of a company 
and encouraging more female to make more efforts to work in the top 
of the company. Thus, the impact of the female directors could be 
detected more easily and more clearly.  
 
In terms of aspect of the future research, the future research could be 
conducted in extreme circumstance, in which case that the impact of 
female directors could be detected more obvious. The future studies 
conducted in the area of the impact of female directors could be based 
on the research of the psychological research and personality test. It 
means that before conducting  the empirical study of impact of 
female directors on the audit fees, a psychological study could be 
conducted first in order to test if the female directors are real more 
risk averse than the male directors. Then the test for the personality 
and the leadership would be conducted in order to select the female 
directors who have the unique personality and leadership that their 
male counterparts do not have. After the conducting the a series of 
tests, the female directors finally selected as the sample of the 
research would be the ones who tend to be more risk averse with 
unique personality and leadership that their male counterparts do not 
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have. In this case, the impact of female directors and reason for the 
impact could be explained in a more clearly circumstance. What is 
more, another extreme circumstance could be that the research is 
conducted with a sample selected for the industry with more female 
directors, in this way, the low status condition of female directors 
could be eliminated to some extent and the impact of female director 
could be more significant. 
 
6.3 Limitation of this study 
This study has offered an evaluative results on the impact of female 
directors towards the audit efforts, but there is still limitation for this 
study. Because of the limited resources of data base and time, the 
sample size selected may be not that big to explain the relationship 
between the impact of female directors and the audit fee. As well, the 
sample selected from the FTSE 250, if the sample could be selected 
from a broader range of companies including both public companies 
and unlisted companies, the results could be more meaningful, more 
significant and more representative. The data used are just based on 
the UK market, more kinds of markets should be tested. 
 
In conclude, based on the previous literatures, an empirical study is 
conducted in this paper, majoring on studying the impact of the 
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female director on board towards the audit efforts. The data used in 
this paper is derived from FTSE 250 and the major methodology 
adopted in the empirical study is OLS regression method. The results 
show that in UK market there is no relationship between 
representations of female directors and the audit fees (the proxy of 
audit efforts). The main determinants of the audit fee should be the 
operational and financial statistics of the company. As for the board 
characteristics, the results show that the proxies diligence (NOME) 
and the independence (NEDPR) cannot influence the audit efforts.  
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